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DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EUR AND EAP

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [WMD](#) [CT](#) [PTER](#) [KN](#) [KS](#) [FR](#)
SUBJECT: FRANCE WANTS MORE CONCRETE MEASURES TO GIVE TEETH
TO UNSCR 1695

REF: A) STATE 150039 B) PARIS 05639 C) STATE 136495

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: MFA nonproliferation office, while reiterating France's steadfast support for international efforts to constrain North Korea's weapons program and enforce UNSCR 1695, expressed some concern about a perceived lack of concrete mechanisms -- whether in the Proliferation Security Initiative or UNSCR 1695 -- to insure that the transfer of technology, materials and finances to or from North Korea is truly curbed. France emphasized that any initiatives must acknowledge Russia and China's role as PSI partners. End Summary.

¶2. (C) On September 13, in response to a previous MFA request, we shared Ref A points with Arnaud Mentre, MFA official in the office of disarmament and non-proliferation responsible for North Korea, as to how the U.S. envisions leveraging existing procedures and cooperation under PSI to support UNSCR 1695 and the interdiction of missile-related shipments and activities.

¶3. (C) Mentre, speaking frankly, provided us with his initial assessment that the procedures described might be too vague and possibly generic to combat resourceful and well-funded proliferators. Shipping routes evolve, proliferators' boats carry different flags or company names, and specious manifests may conceal dangerous cargo, he said. Further, because PSI does not target a single country, its measures are too diffuse to enable PSI partners to hone in on North Korean proliferation. He cautioned that if PSI is their only defense, well-intentioned nations might remain one step behind North Korea's missile-related shipments.

¶4. (C) Asked if he had French suggestions to offer, Mentre only noted that PSI partners could establish some mechanism to facilitate the sharing of intelligence on particular shipping routes, transfer points, and companies suspected to be involved in North Korean proliferation efforts. Although the disbanding of the PSI core group precludes such regular information sharing, he said its reinstitution was not necessarily the best way forward, as it could introduce a slow-moving bureaucratic overlay.

¶5. (C) Mentre cautioned that any additional measures should be implemented while taking into account the concerns of Russia and China. "The goal should be to achieve the maximum operational gain with the minimum diplomatic fallout." He proposed encouraging Russia to contribute meaningfully as a newer PSI partner, and to engage with China on the idea that maintaining its status as an interlocutor with North Korea is compatible with refusing to accept its ballistic missile program and proliferation activities.

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